This paper is divided into two parts. The first proposes a philosophical frame and it "uses" for this a recent book on a phenomenological approach to the foundations of mathematics. Gödel's 1931 theorem and his subsequent philosophical reflections have a major role in discussing this perspective and we will develop our views along the lines of the book (and further on). The first part will also hint to the connections with some results in Mathematical physics, in particular with Poincaré's unpredictability (three-body) theorem, as an opening towards the rest of the paper. As a matter of fact, the second part deals with the "incompleteness" phenomenon in Quantum physics, a wording due to Einstein in a famous joint paper of 1935, still now an issue under discussion for many. Similarities and differences w.r. to the logical notion of incompleteness will be highlighted. A constructivist approach to knowledge, both in mathematics and in physics, underlies our attempted "unified" understanding of these apparently unrelated theoretical issues.
Part I
Revisiting Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics 1 Constructivism is the most common philosophical attitude in the mathematics (and practice) of Computing and this in contrast with the prevailing debate in mathematical circles still ranging from Platonism to Formalism. But, what do we mean, today, by "conceptual construction", in the broadest sense? Phenomenology may provide one possible answer to this, by a deeply renewed understanding of Weyl's (and Brouwer's) ideas, in a perspective close to Husserl's philosophy. Tieszen's book proposes a critical account of modern views in the foundations of mathematics, which is of direct concern for the logician and the theoretician in natural sciences who wants to reflect on the constructive principles of the mathematical intelligibility of the world. We will refer to this book to go further and motivate a broadening of the notion of "construction" as given in formal deductions and arithmetical computations, in either classical or intuitionistic frames. By this broadening, we will understand the incompleteness phenomenon as a "gap" between mathematical construction principles and formal proof principles, following and further devellopping some ideas hinted in [2].
Tieszen's perspective is original, as the Philosophy of mathematics has been largely dominated by a contraposition between Ontologism and Nominalism, as recalled above. This separated the foundational analysis of mathematics both from our lifeworld and from other scientific domains, including physics where mathematics has a constitutive role. By correlating foundational issues in mathematics and physics, along the lines of [2], we will try to recompose the foundational break, at least as for the issue of incompleteness.
Part I.1
The first part of Tieszen'book is dedicated to an introduction to a Husserlian perspective in the foundations of mathematics. It is interesting per se, as a broad survey of Husserl's phenomenology. This is made possible by the relevance that Husserl himself gave to Logic and mathematics in his philosophy of knowledge: writings on Logic and Arithmetic are among the earliest of Husserl's and the related issues accompany his lifelong work.
The constitution of ideal objects, in Husserlian terms, is based on a clear distinction between the transcendental perspective and psychologism. It is the human subject who makes science possible, yet the common endeavour of the historical community should not be confused with the individual analysis: epistemology is a genetic analysis, provided that history is not understood in the usual limited sense, explains Husserl in the "Origin of Geometry" (1933) . There are different types and levels of consciousness, which allow the historical dynamics of knowledge: science is built up from the lifeworld experience of human subjects on the basis of active abstraction, idealization, reflection, formalization. The objectivity of knowledge is a constructed one, a result of the interaction by an active subject, beginning with "kinaesthesia", in a living body, in everyday world of life. Meaning is not the passive interpretation of independent signs, but it is constructed in this interaction, it is the result of a "friction" and of structuring of this very world by our attempts to give sense to it; meaning is the result of an action. Of course, we dare to add, this must be understood in a broad sense: Quantum Mechanics for example seems to owe little to kinaesthesia. Yet, it is a paradigmatic case where meaning is the result of active consciousness, beginning with the preparation of the experiment or of the technical context for insight: we are conscious of a quantum object as
